This paper gives an overview of sustainability and management of the straddling stock fisheries for Norwegian spring spawning herring, mackerel, and blue whiting. These stocks are harvested by coastal states and distant water fishing states (DWFS). Because multiple states access these stocks, reaching agreements on management has posed challenges, and some agreements have unravelled. For the blue whiting, the fishing industry itself played a major role in facilitating an agreement. A general lesson learned is that changes in fish migrations and stock distribution may destabilize international agreements.
INTRODUCTION
According to the 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA), straddling 1 fish stocks and highly migratory 2 fish stocks are to be managed by Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) (Bjørndal and Munro 2003) , consisting of coastal states and relevant Distant Water Fishing States (DWFSs) with a "real" interest in the fishery. This Agreement has now acquired the status of international law, although, in principle, it is binding only for the signatories.
In the North East Atlantic, there are several straddling stocks that are exploited both within coastal states' 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) and on the high seas. Management of such stocks poses special management problems that is governed by the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), an RFMO (Bjørndal 2009 ). Essentially, and for the purpose of this article, NEAFC's Regulatory Area consists of the North East Atlantic. A subset of this, the high-sea area known as "the Banana Hole" of the Norwegian Sea (between the Non-cooperative management of resources is likely to lead to overexploitation as evidenced by the three stocks under consideration. Based on game theoretic analysis, some basic principles of cooperative management have been derived (Hannesson 2011; Bailey, Sumaila, and Lindroos 2010) . Given the ability of players to communicate, at least three conditions must hold for a cooperative agreement to be preferred to competitive exploitation. First, the solution must be Pareto optimal. Thus, if one country is to gain more, it can only be at the expense of others. Second, payoff from cooperation must be at least as great as under non-cooperation; i.e., everybody must gain from cooperating. Third, the solution must be time consistent or resilient.
Cooperative management of straddling fish stocks will likely be more difficult than cooperative management of shared fish stocks; i.e., transboundary fish stocks that migrate between the EEZs of two or more coastal states. An example is provided by Iceland in the mackerel fishery, as due to changes in the migratory pattern, mackerel has recently been found also in the Icelandic EEZ. This situation compares to the "new member problem," in which a new country begins fishing on the high seas for a stock that other have been cooperatively conserving (Kaitala and Munro 1997) . However, Ellefsen (2013) showed that the stability of the agreement was better when prices are heterogeneous-in this case, the prices for mackerel are lower in summer than in the winter. This is because players have a lower default position when they cannot get the maximum price for their catch. Thus, the game becomes more stable. Moreover, if the new entrant is barred from entering coalitions with other players except the grand coalition, the new player receives only its non-cooperative payoff. This situation increased the stability of the agreement because there were fewer "blocking" coalitions (Ellefsen 2013). 3. NEAFC also has other regulatory areas, but they are not of relevance to this article. 4. Redfish is a demersal (bottom-dwelling) fish. The term "pelagic redfish" is used because it is harvested by pelagic trawl. 5. This section draws heavily on Bjørndal and Munro (2007, 2012) .
Under the terms of the UN Fish Stock Agreement, would-be new members cannot be barred from an RFMO unless they refuse to abide by the RFMO management regime.
Resolution of the new member problem may call for granting "charter" members of an RFMO de facto property rights to the relevant resources. Possible solutions to the problem may be that a new country may join only if an established country leaves, a waiting period for new entrants is introduced, or fees are imposed on new entrants. Some of these issues depend critically on a legal interpretation of the UN Fish Stock Agreement. Because many the world's fish stocks are seriously depleted (FAO 2012) , including many straddling stocks, RFMOs will be faced with the task of rebuilding stocks. To the degree this is successful, the incentives for new countries to enter the fishery increase.
If RFMOs lead to successful cooperative resource management, relevant high seas adjacent to EEZ will become high seas in name only, and the stock will be managed as a shared stock.
Unforeseen changes in fish stock migrations between national EEZs make the issue of arriving at and maintaining cooperative agreements on total allowable catches (TAC) and the distribution of these among interested nations difficult. Zonal Attachment is a concept that has been suggested as a way to overcome disputes on how to share the quotas of such fish stocks. The concept has been applied to the management of shared stocks between the European Union (EU) and Norway Hannesson 2013a) . Briefly, this works as follows. "Zonal attachment" of a stock is the share of the stock residing within a particular country's EEZ, weighted by the time it spends in a country's zone over a year, if necessary. This, then determines, or at least influences, the share that each country gets of the total catch quota for that stock.
With the division of catch quotas based on zonal attachment of fish stocks, it is not surprising that changes in fish migrations lead to a breakdown of existing agreements. This is an example in which a cooperative agreement may not be time-consistent. This was indeed the reason for the temporary breakdown in the cooperative management agreement for Norwegian spring spawning herring during the period 2003-07 (see Bjørndal and Munro 2012 for further analysis).
However, the problems surrounding the zonal attachment as a basis for the division of overall fish quotas do not end there. One may ask whether zonal attachment is at all a suitable criterion to distribute fish quotas. The answer is "not necessarily," as discussed by Hannesson (2006 Hannesson ( , 2007 in the context of a given zonal attachment. Further, when Hannesson (2013a) extended the analysis to cases where the zonal attachment varies over time and more than one stock is involved, the results largely confirmed the previous results. Stock sharing based on zonal attachment was shown as likely to be unacceptable, because it would give the country with a minor interest a worse outcome than it would get by pursuing its own interest in the absence of cooperation. However, Hannesson (2013a) also showed that the scope of cooperation is greater if countries share more than one stock. For this to happen, each country has to be a dominant player with respect to one stock. If a country is a minor player for both stocks, there is only an extended version of the minor player problem (Hannesson 2013c) .
These results have empirical implications. As has often been pointed out, the countries involved share several stocks (herring and blue whiting, besides mackerel), all of which fluctuate over time in ways that seem largely uncorrelated. The idea has been put forward that it ought to be easier to agree on sharing these stocks if they all were considered jointly. What these results have shown is that this is not necessarily the case (Hannesson 2013a,b) . The problem is that the Faroe Islands and Iceland are minor players with respect to all of these stocks, and because of this, agreement will not necessarily be any easier when considering all of them jointly.
OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT STOCKS

NORTHEAST ATLANTIC MACKEREL
The International Council for the Exploration of the Seas (ICES) currently uses the term "North East Atlantic Mackerel" (Scomber scombrus) to define mackerel present in the area extending from ICES Division IXa in the south to Division IIa in the north, including mackerel in the North Sea and Division IIIa.
Total catches peaked in 1979 at 843,000 tonnes, and more recently in 1993 and 1994 at around 820,000 tonnes (figure 1). They remained at about 650,000 tonnes since 1995, but catches declined to around 473,000 tonnes in 2006. Subsequently they recovered, with catches of 735,000 tonnes recorded in 2009.
ICES classifies the stock as being harvested unsustainably. Spawning stock biomass (SSB) was around 2.5 million tonnes for the period 1992-99, but subsequently declined to 1.75 million tonnes in 2002-03. It has shown an increasing trend in recent years, with 2.98 million tonnes recorded in 2010 (figure 1). Misreporting of catches is also a serious problem. The ICES Working Group on the Assessment of Mackerel, Horse Mackerel, Sardine, and Anchovy (ICES 2007) found substantial levels of unaccounted mortality, and these unaccounted removals were estimated to be more than 60% of the reported catch. The Coastal States, the EU, the Faroe Islands, and Norway have adopted a series of control measures regarding the weighing and inspection of landings for mackerel that should help to resolve this problem.
A number of countries harvest mackerel. Harvests by the most significant countries are given in figure 2. According to the official catch statistics, in 2005 about 60% of the catches were taken by member countries of the EU, followed by Norway (28%), Russia (9%), the Faroe Islands (2%), and Iceland (less than 0.1%). In 2009, EU countries accounted for 53.5%, followed by Norway (19.2%), Iceland (18.4%), Russia (6.6%), and the Faroe Islands (2.3%). Landings of mackerel in the Convention Area and in Regulatory Area in 2004 were reported to be 527,000 and 41,000 tonnes, respectively (NEAFC 2006) .
While Iceland had virtually no harvest of mackerel until 2007, this changed in 2008, when Icelandic pelagic fishing companies caught 112,000 tonnes of mackerel, increasing to 116,000 tonnes in 2009. This appears to be due to changes in the distribution pattern of mackerel, which now partly migrate into the Icelandic EEZ. While Iceland had no quota and hardly any catches in the past, this has changed in recent years. It also means that the mackerel "game" has changed, with essentially the appearance of a new coastal state. At this point, it is still uncertain what impact this development may have on the management of mackerel (Hannesson 2013b) . An internationally agreed-upon TAC regulated the fishery. In addition, a number of management measures are in place to protect the North Sea component of the stock that is considered depleted, as well as to protect juvenile mackerel.
The international agreement for management of the mackerel fishery broke down after Iceland became a major player as of 2008. Even when an agreement was in place, despite attempts to control allowable catches, landings exceeded the annual TACs in most years (22 out of 23), sometimes by a considerable amount. The situation appears to be worsening. In 2009, the total agreed upon TAC was 605,000 tonnes, not including the unilateral Norway/ Faroe Islands' TAC first declared this year and the Icelandic TAC; the Advisory Committee for Fisheries Management (ACFM) catch was recorded at 735,000 tonnes. For 2010, there was no internationally agreed upon TAC.
Although mackerel stock is at a high level, with spawning stock biomass estimated at 2.928 million tonnes for 2010 (figure 1), ICES considers the fishery unsustainable due to the fact there is no international management agreement for the fishery.
In one of the earliest references to the mackerel fishery in the economics literature, Kennedy's (2003) approach was that of game theory, where non-cooperative games between three players-Norway, the EU, and Russia-were considered. However, the "rules" of the game have recently changed, with Iceland emerging as a new player.
From theoretical studies of fisheries games, we know that non-cooperative equilibria can be extremely destructive. Could this be the case in the mackerel fishery? There is some reason to think so.
The destructive non-cooperative equilibria in fisheries games are due to insensitivity of the unit cost of harvesting to the size of the fish stock, giving players maximising their individual profit an incentive to drive down the stock to a low, perhaps unsustainable, level (Bjørndal 1988) . The technology applied in the mackerel fishery (mainly purse seining) is suspected to produce such stock-independent unit costs. Yet, when Hannesson (2014) contrasted the outcome in the mackerel fishery with predictions by the game-theoretic approach, it stood out as surprisingly moderate. A possible reason is that unit costs might be stock dependent. Another possibility is that the parties could implicitly recognize the destructive character of a NashCournot non-cooperative equilibrium and tacitly apply a moderate fishing strategy, even if not fully cooperative.
NORWEGIAN SPRING SPAWNING HERRING
The Norwegian spring spawning herring (Clupea harengus), or Atlanto-Scandian herring, is distributed throughout large parts of the North East Atlantic during its lifespan (Bjørndal et al. 1998 ). The fishery is important for employment and revenue in many countries, including Norway (which records the largest annual harvest), Iceland, Russia, the Faroe Islands, and some other member countries of the EU . The fishery for Norwegian spring spawning herring follows the migration of the stock closely as it moves from its wintering and spawning grounds along the Norwegian coast to its summer feeding grounds in the Faroese, Icelandic, Jan Mayen, Svalbard, and international areas. In the 1950s and 1960s, Norwegian spring spawning herring was a major commercial species, and the stock was subject to heavy exploitation . The annual harvest peaked at 2 million tonnes in 1966, but by this time, the stock was in serious decline. By the late 1960s the mature stock was almost depleted due to overfishing (Bjørndal et al. 1998) . A large increase in fishing effort, new technology, and environmental changes contributed to the collapse of this stock by the late 1960s. Due to the moratorium that was put in place to allow an increase in the spawning stock, it recovered by the late 1980s/early 1990s (figure 3).
Until 1994, the fishery was almost entirely confined to Norwegian coastal waters, but during the summer of 1994 there were also catches in the offshore areas of the Norwegian Sea for the first time in 26 years, due to resumption of its traditional migratory pattern. In 1995, the Advisory Committee on Fishery Management (ACFM) of the ICES recommended a TAC of 513,000 tonnes. However, the participating countries ignored the recommendation, and the collective harvest of Norway, Russia, Iceland, the Faroe Islands, and the EU exceeded 900,000 tonnes, almost twice the quantity recommended by the ACFM (Bjørndal et al. 1998) . The fishery expanded further the subsequent year (figure 3).
In 1996, the EU, the Faroe Islands, Iceland, Norway, and Russia agreed to implement a long-term management plan for Norwegian spring spawning herring. The management plan was part of the international agreement on total quota setting and sharing of the quota during the years 1997-2002. The parties agreed to maintain a level of SSB greater than the critical level (Blim) of 2.5 million tonnes and to restrict their fishing based on a TAC consistent with a fishing mortality rate of less than 0.125 for appropriate age groups as defined by ICES for 2001 and subsequent years.
In addition, there was a number of bilateral agreements between the countries involved. Fishermen from other countries were allowed to harvest part of their quota in the Norwegian EEZ and the control zone around Jan Mayen, which is under Norwegian jurisdiction, thus enabling them to harvest at a time of year when the herring contain more fat and thus are more valuable. Moreover, fishermen from other countries are allowed to land their harvests in Norway, which tend to reduce transportation distances and thus increase the prices they fetch. This policy would also benefit the Norwegian fish processing industry. Juvenile herring mature in the Russian EEZ. To compensate Russia for not harvesting juvenile herring, which would imply growth overfishing, Russia is given a quota in the Norwegian EEZ.
The management plans and coastal state agreements were suspended between 2003 and 2006 due to a disagreement over allocation of quotas. In this period, the bilateral agreements between Norway and other countries were also suspended, except for that between Norway and Russia regarding juvenile herring.
In January 2007, however, the EU, the Faroe Islands, Iceland, Norway, and the Russian Federation signed an agreement on the management of this stock for 2007. The Parties agreed on a TAC for the Norwegian spring spawning herring of 1.518 million tonnes in 2008. The allocation of the quotas is as follows: European Community 6.51%, the Faroe Islands 5.16%, Iceland 14.51%, Norway 61.00%, and the Russian Federation 12.82%. The relative quotas have remained unchanged.
The Norwegian spring spawning herring fishery provides an interesting example with regard to the management of straddling fish stocks. As mentioned, when the stock was in a depressed state, it stayed fully in the Norwegian EEZ. analysed cooperative and competitive management of this stock, including the question whether it might be profitable for Norway to break away from cooperation and maintain a lower stock that would remain under Norwegian control. The analysis showed that cooperation would provide greater benefits to all players than competition, and that under no alternative would it benefit a player in the long run to break away from cooperation.
In 1997-2002, the partners agreed on the setting of the annual TAC and the shares for each country. The reason the agreement broke down in 2003 was the Norwegian demands for a higher share of the TAC. These claims were based on the zonal attachment principle (Monstad 2004) . It turned out that the herring spent more time in the Norwegian EEZ than expected when the first agreement was reached and, based on this principle, Norway laid claim to a greater share of the quota. This showed that the original cooperative agreement was not time consistent. In the end, only minor adjustments to the quota shares were made. Although Norway's quota demands were not met, Norway preferred a cooperative agreement to a noncooperative one.
In addition to and Bjørndal and Munro (2012) , this fishery was analysed by Arnason, Magnusson, and Agnarsson (2000) who based their analysis on a migratory model, where exploitation by different nations is represented by a game theoretic model. Based on general experiments, Arnason, Magnusson, and Agnarsson (2000) inter alia found that cooperation always leads to more profit than competition. The presence of many exploiters under competition often leads to the virtual (or even complete) depletion of the stock after a short period of time and that if a particular exploiter has a relatively small EEZ from which to fish, it will fish very aggressively whenever the stock migrates into his zone.
BLUE WHITING
Blue whiting (Micromesistius poutassou) is a pelagic gadoid that is widely distributed in the eastern part of the North Atlantic. The highest concentrations are found along the edge of the continental shelf in areas west of the British Isles and on the Rockall Bank plateau where it occurs in large schools at depths ranging between 300 and 600 m. It is also present in almost all other management areas between the Barents Sea and the Strait of Gibraltar and west to the Irminger Sea.
Multinational fishing for blue whiting started at the end of the 1970s, with participation mainly from the former Soviet Union (Russia) and Norway (Standal 2006 and Ekerhovd 2007) . In most of the 1980s and 1990s, catches were rather stable; however, they have increased rapidly since 1998 (figure 4), and a new catch record was set almost every year, with catches over 2 million tonnes in [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . Since then, there has been a substantial decline in catches, with 635,000 tonnes recorded for 2009. For a time, the blue whiting fishery was the largest fishery in the North East Atlantic. Its total catch was in excess of two million tonnes in 2006. According to the official catch statistics of NEAFC, Norway accounted for 37% of the total catch in 2005, followed by the EU (19%), Russia (17%), Iceland (13%), and the Faroe Islands (13%). Annual catches by country for 1995-2011 are illustrated in figure 5 and showed a very substantial increase until 2006, when they started to decline. This was in line with developments in stock size. The landings of blue whiting in the Convention Area in 2004 were 2,407,000 tonnes, of which 721,000 tonnes were in the Regulatory Area.
The fishery has been regulated by a TAC system since 1994. NEAFC agreed to follow the advice from ACFM regarding an annual total catch quota, but for many years, the coastal nations set their own quota, the sum of which far exceeded the recommendation from ICES (Standal 2006) . In 2003, for instance, catches of blue whiting reached a record high of almost 2.4 million tonnes (figure 5), whereas advised catch limit from ICES was around 600,000 tonnes.
On December 16, 2005, after six years of negotiations, the coastal states of the EU, the Faroe Islands, Iceland, and Norway signed an agreement. The agreement, starting in 2006, includes a long-run management strategy that implies annual reductions in landings until management goals are reached (Bjørndal 2009 ). This arrangement provided for catches in 2006 of 2 million tonnes allocated as follows: EU 30.5%, Faroe Islands 26.13%, Norway 25.75% and Iceland 17.63%. Russia will be accommodated by transfers from some of the coastal states and additional catches in the NEAFC area (Bjørndal 2009 ). In 2006, Russian catches represented 16.3% of total catch.
The history leading up to the 2005 agreement is most interesting. Apart from the Russian Federation and Norway, which developed the fishery, blue whiting was mainly fished by vessels from the Faroe Islands and countries from the EU. Only minor fishing was carried out by Icelandic vessels until the mid-1990s, when a new Icelandic fishery was initiated by a fleet of powerful vessels (Pálsson 2005) . Consequently, Icelandic catches of blue whiting increased rapidly, reaching 501,000 tonnes in 2003 (Bjørndal 2009 ).
For many years, the coastal states were not able to reach an agreement on the management of the blue whiting stock. One possible reason for this was pressure from the national fishermen organizations. Then, suddenly, when the fishermen agreed, the coastal states follow. There are probably several reasons for this change in mode. One is that that the fishermen knew that the stock could not sustain such a high fishing mortality much longer without collapsing. Secondly, catches were already decreasing compared to just a couple of years earlier, and this encouraged vessel owners to find a solution as to how a TAC should be divided while there still was something to share. Another factor that was instrumental for the Norwegian vessel owners' willingness to negotiate was that the blue whiting fishery in Norwegian waters during summer and autumn had not been the success they had hoped for, and therefore did not back up Norway's claim to a 37% share of the TAC.
With regard to blue whiting, there exist two game theoretic studies (Ekerhovd 2008 (Ekerhovd , 2010 . Ekerhovd (2008) investigates the effects of distribution scenarios between the coastal states, which can harvest blue whiting within their respective EEZ. Russia is currently not recognized as a coastal state for blue whiting, but changing distribution may challenge this, with implications for management (Ekerhovd 2010) .
ICES has evaluated the 2006 management plan and found it to not be in accordance with the precautionary approach in a period of low recruitment. In July 2008, a new draft management plan was proposed by the Coastal States. ICES has evaluated the draft management plan and considers it precautionary if fishing mortality in the first year should immediately be reduced to the fishing mortality that is implied by the Harvest Control Rule (ICES 2009).
Year classes [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] are among the lowest observed. Due to recent low recruitment, SSB has declined from its historical peak in 2003-2004 of more than 6 million tonnes to 1.3 million tonnes at the beginning of 2010. Based on the management plan, ICES calculated a TAC for 2011 at 40,100 tonnes. This TAC advice was later followed by NEAFC.
In 2009, based on the agreed management plan (F = 0.18), ICES advised that catches in 2010 should be 540,000 tonnes. This advice was followed quite closely (TAC 548,000 tonnes). The advice for 2011 to follow the management plan (TAC 40,100 tonnes) was also followed; however, actual catches in 2010 were probably more than twice as high due to quota transfers from 2010 and other reasons (ICES 2012).
AGGREGATE CATCH AND VALUE
Total annual catch of the three species under consideration in the post-2000 period has varied between 2.95 and 3.8 million tonnes (table 1). The relative importance of the species has varied considerably over time, as is to be expected for pelagic species.
We have also made an estimate of total value of the three species. This was calculated based on Norwegian first-hand prices (table 1) . In other words, we assume all fishermen harvesting these three species fetch the same prices as Norwegian fishermen. As prices vary by country and technology, these estimates can only be considered an indication of the potential values involved (Lappo 2013) .
Based on these assumptions, total nominal value per year varies between 6,255 million NOK (2000) and 16,918 million NOK (2011). The relative variation in value is much more substantial than that for quantity. The changes in value over time are explained by differences in the composition of the total catch and different prices for the different species, as well as changes in these variables over time (Lappo 2013) .
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The pelagic fisheries of the North East Atlantic are all harvested by fishermen from the same five countries/parties: the EU, Norway, the Faroe Islands, Iceland, and Russia. However, the countries' status is not equal in all fisheries. For instance, Russia is regarded as a coastal state with regard to Norwegian spring spawning herring, while considered a DWFS with respect to the mackerel and blue whiting fisheries. Moreover, Iceland, a coastal state in the herring fishery, claims coastal state status with respect to blue whiting and mackerel. Initially contested, Iceland's coastal state status in the blue whiting fishery was accepted by the other coastal states when they signed a management agreement in 2005.
Since the 1980s, the mackerel fishery was an issue between the EU and Norway, setting an overall catch quota and dividing it among them. Later, the Faroe Islands came to participate in this arrangement. Iceland had not previously fished mackerel in any significant amounts, but began doing so when it migrated into its waters. Iceland was not satisfied with the quota offered by the others and unilaterally set a quota for itself. Soon after, the Faroese withdrew from the cooperation with the EU and Norway, finding their quota allocation unacceptably low, compared with what Iceland was taking. The quotas are set by the coastal states, which de facto manage the fisheries, instead of NEAFC, the relevant RFMO (Bjørndal 2009 ). This explains the importance of being a coastal state, rather than a DWFS, however "real" the interest in the fishery may be.
A common trait among these fisheries is that the management agreement has not been time consistent. Either the cooperative agreements collapsed or there have been severe difficulties achieving cooperation. This happens when there are unforeseen changes in migrations, distribution, and abundance of the stocks.
Since they are harvested by the same countries, one might think that a way to overcome these difficulties is to manage all three stocks jointly. However, for this to be the case, each country has to be a dominant player with respect to at least one stock. The problem is that the Faroe Islands and Iceland must be considered minor players with respect to all three stocks, and considering them jointly will not necessarily make an agreement any easier to achieve.
One lesson learned from this analysis is how unexpected changes in fish migrations may destabilize existing international management agreements. This is clearly illustrated for herring, where stock migration and distribution proved to be different from what was anticipated when the first agreement was achieved. It is also the case for mackerel, where the fact that this stock now migrates into the Icelandic EEZ has made it much more difficult to achieve a management agreement.
Even if we are dealing with only three case studies, it is likely that this kind of breakdown may also be experienced in other areas, as stock migrations change due to climate change. This result echoes Miller and Munro (2004) , who point out that when management agreements lack time consistency, they are at risk of floundering at some time in the future. The kind of change that occurred in the migration patterns for herring and mackerel could not have been predicted. Bjørndal and Munro (2012) point out that it is obvious that time consistency, or resiliency, demands that the scope for bargaining should be made as broad as possible.
An interesting aspect of the blue whiting management agreement is how the fishermen's organizations were instrumental in setting the groundwork for an agreement. During the summer of 2005, prior to the coastal state agreement, representatives from various fishermen's organizations from the EU, Iceland, and Norway negotiated and signed an agreement, similar to the one signed later that year by officials from the coastal states.
Finally, NEAFC seems to play only a minor role and to be subordinate to the coastal states. This is likely since the only non-coastal state for two out of the three stocks is Russia, which has a long history in these fisheries, while the others are coastal states.
The management history of these three straddling fish stocks illustrates many of the problems that managers of such stocks face worldwide. In addition, these stocks are closely linked; their habitats overlap, and they are fished by the same fishermen from only a handful of countries. In spite of these similarities, they are managed, at least formally, as if they were unrelated. Although multispecies management is no guarantee for stable, resilient cooperation, we can ask if that would be a better way to proceed in the future.
